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Following the cessation of hostilities in May 2009, the 
Government of Sri Lanka has announced a suitably 
ambitious macroeconomic vision to capitalize on the 
peace dividend. Its goals include growing at 8 percent 
or more per year and lowering government indebtedness 
from around 80 to 60 percent of GDP by 2015. This 
paper’s main finding is that while some post-conflict 
bounce is only to be expected, sustaining high growth 
presents significant challenges. A substantial rise in the 
national investment and savings rates will be needed to 
This paper is a product of the Policies and International Partnerships Unit, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 
Network; and Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, South Asia Region. It is part of a larger effort by the 
World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the 
world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be 
contacted at dfonseka@worldbank.org or bpinto2@worldbank.org or mprasad@worldbank.org or frowe@worldbank.org.
sustain growth rates of 8 percent even when accompanied 
by a significant rise in total factor productivity growth. 
With the government’s balance sheet constrained by its 
desire to lower public indebtedness, private investment 
will need to become the engine of growth. This places 
high priority on better infrastructure, clear signals 
about the relative roles of the public and private sectors, 
and hard budget constraints and competition both to 
strengthen the investment climate and spur technological 
upgrading in pursuit of faster productivity growth.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The cessation of hostilities in May 2009 presents an historic opportunity for Sri Lanka to 
embark on an economic trajectory filled with new and abundant promise for all its citizens.  In 
this paper, we define policy priorities designed to convert the momentum from Sri Lanka‘s peace 
dividend into a sustained growth acceleration.  By a ―sustained growth acceleration‖ we mean 
growing at rates substantially higher than the historical average of 5.0 percent (see Figure 1) for a 
prolonged period of time. Indeed, the centerpiece of the government‘s economic vision is 
attaining and maintaining a medium-run target of 8 percent growth or more.
2
     
 
The economic growth literature distinguishes between growth accelerations that are 
sustained and those that are unsustainable (Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik 2005).  Sustained 
growth accelerations are associated with fundamental economic reform, while unsustainable 
growth accelerations are associated with positive external shocks and financial sector 
liberalization.  Nevertheless, both types of growth accelerations are driven largely by 
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 In fact, real GDP growth touched 8 percent in 2010 compared to an average of 5 percent over the previous 
10 years 2000-09;  but this was in part because of a rebound from the effects of the global financial crisis. 
Similarly, while growth in 2011 is estimated at a little over 8 percent, the compound average growth rate 
over the three years 2009-11 is around 6.5 percent. 
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Figure 1. Sri Lanka: Real GDP Growth
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idiosyncratic, and many times, country specific causes. Moreover, growth accelerations are more 
likely for poorer countries, i.e. convergence forces come into play. Perhaps the most encouraging 
finding is that growth accelerations are fairly common. 
Section II sets out three channels for the peace dividend: reintegration of conflict-affected 
areas; macro-fiscal; and microeconomic.  While the three channels will interact with and 
complement each other, our assessment is that the first two are more likely to contribute to a one-
time positive shift in output levels than a sustained increase in the growth rate.  The 
microeconomic channel and the private sector are likely to be the most powerful at the margin in 
delivering a sustained growth acceleration via an increase in total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth.  There are two reasons for this: first, the government‘s balance sheet is highly 
constrained by its high indebtedness and its desire to reduce this.  Second, experience from 
countries as diverse as India, Kenya and Poland indicate that profit-maximizing firms operating in 
an atmosphere of competition, hard budget constraints and competitive real exchange rates offer 
the best hope for upgrading technology and efficiency in pursuit of faster productivity growth.  
Import competition has been a particularly important spur. 
Section III explores the government‘s debt dynamics systematically—not simply because 
the government wants to reduce its indebtedness but because a sustainable fiscal position is a 
necessary underpinning for fast, long run growth.
3
  We show that the impressive reduction in the 
government‘s debt-to-GDP ratio between 2002 and 2010 was driven in important part by the 
inflation tax on debt, helped by a pick-up in growth.  In view of the low inflation target, reducing 
indebtedness further must rely much more on sustained and even faster growth.   
Section IV presents results from a growth simulation exercise asking what level of 
national savings is needed for meeting the government‘s growth target.  The results show that a 
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 Sustainable debt dynamics and moderate indebtedness reduce macroeconomic uncertainty, lower the 
chances of crowding out and create fiscal space both for key public investments as well as allowing 
countercyclical fiscal policy. 
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substantial rise in national savings will be needed to deliver 8 percent growth.  This will be made 
easier by increasing government savings and creating conditions for a big increase in productivity 
growth.  The private sector will need to play a key role in the latter and this brings us to section V 
on the microeconomic foundations of growth.  Section VI concludes with a summary of policy 
priorities.  
The results in this paper are derived from a combination of the Government of Sri 
Lanka‘s (GoSL) macro-fiscal vision, cross-country experience from fast-growing economies and 
economic theory.  GoSL‘s key macro-fiscal targets are as follows:4   
 Double per capita income from US $2000 in 2009 to US $4000 by 2016 
 Reduce government debt-to-GDP from 81 percent in 2010 to 60 percent in 2015 
 Raise government savings from minus 2-3 percent of GDP to plus 1.5 percent 
 Aim for inflation based on GDP deflator of 6 percent per year 
 Target growth at 8 percent per year over the medium run. 
 
II. CAPITALIZING ON THE PEACE DIVIDEND 
In principle, the peace dividend for Sri Lanka would flow through the following 
channels:  
 Reintegration channel: The reintegration of the war-torn North and East into the economy 
would fuel a natural expansion of output. 
 Macro-fiscal channel: This would exert positive benefits through two sub-channels.  First, 
real interest rates on government borrowing would tend to decline along with sovereign risk 
premia (see Figure 2) while the currency would tend to appreciate as capital flowed in to take 
advantage of ‗undervalued‘ Sri Lankan assets, financial and real.  As a result, the 
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government‘s debt dynamics would improve.  Second, the government would be able to 
reduce security-related spending and increase development spending. 
 Microeconomic channel: Longer business horizons and the falling cost of capital for the 
private sector facilitated by growing political stability and fiscal consolidation would 
strengthen the microeconomic foundations for growth.   Rising confidence would make Sri 
Lanka a more attractive destination for FDI, prompt foreign buyers to source more of their 
purchases from Sri Lanka and push established domestic businesses to explore diversification 
into new areas.  The net result would be an increase in investment and faster growth. 
 
The strength of the reintegration channel would depend upon how important the North 
and East were in income generation prior to the conflict and how quickly economic activity there 
can pick up. Prior to the onset of the war in 1983 the North and East Provinces accounted for a 
small share of national output and employment.  In 1983, the contribution to national industrial 
value added of both provinces was less than 10 percent (approximately 2 percent of GDP), while 
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the employment shares were also less than 10 percent of total employment in the economy.
5
 The 
structure of the economy was dominated by agriculture – 33 percent of total output and 80 
percent of employment – and the produce obtained (e.g. onions and chilies) was mainly for 
domestic consumption and not for export. More than one half of the country‘s fish catch in 1980 
came from the North and the East.  
During the war period, it is estimated that the area under cultivation in the North and the 
East fell by between 50 and 80 percent, paddy production fell off almost entirely, and industrial 
production virtually halted. The bulk of the reduction was concentrated in the North, while paddy 
production in the East was essentially unchanged over the period.  Migration out of the areas took 
place, both to other parts of the Island and to foreign destinations, but the population share of 
these areas was still about 13 percent in 2001, although, the depletion of the social and economic 
infrastructure during the war means that the human capital stock has fallen behind the rest of the 
country. It is also the case that some of the agriculture activities in the North were not totally 
abandoned; they simply moved to other areas like Puttalam, and may not be expected to return.   
With this background, the contribution of the North and the East to future economic 
growth prospects will likely be modest. Reconstruction activities will provide a one-time boost in 
growth, but beyond that it seems that small-holder agriculture and the fisheries sector will be the 
main sources of continued growth. Looking back at the response in the North and East after the 
2002 cease fire agreement can provide some indication of what we might expect. The agriculture 
and fishing sectors grew more than 30 percent per year over the 2002-2004 period. The combined 
share of paddy production in the North and East increased by 4 percentage points to 31 percent of 
national production by 2003. Tourism rebounded in the East with the rebound in tourist arrivals to 
all parts of the country. While those developments were impressive in that the growth was broad-
based and likely pro-poor, the small overall share of these provinces in country-wide GDP and 
employment meant that they were a modest driver of national growth.  
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 The population in the two provinces was about 14 percent of the country‘s total. 
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To exploit the potential of the North and the East, infrastructure would need to be 
improved and private investors would need to take an active interest in those regions.  This 
channel is therefore likely to mesh with the macro-fiscal channels (diversion of security spending 
towards infrastructure and reconstruction) and the microeconomic channel.   
On the macro-fiscal channel, the relatively closed capital account combined with the 
dominant role of state banks acted to keep real interest rates at highly negative levels in the recent 
past.  Going forward, the effect of falling risk premia on interest rates may be offset by growing 
external financial integration, keeping real interest rates at positive levels (as assumed in official 
medium-run projections).  Therefore, the main macro-fiscal benefit is going to stem from the 
ability to reduce security-related spending and reverse the trend decline in revenue mobilization 
(in important part by eliminating the tax breaks doled out by the Board of Investment, which 
should no longer be needed to compensate for the erstwhile risky environment).  This would 
facilitate achieving the large increase in public savings needed for sustainable rapid growth.   
While falling risk premia may not have large benefits for the government in terms of 
lower real interest rates, the impact on the private sector would be beneficial to the extent that it 
was implicitly subsidizing the borrowing costs of the government.  Overall, given longer horizons 
and greater stability, the microeconomic channel could become a powerful channel for the peace 
dividend and sustainable long run growth as firms invest in new technology and branch out into 
new areas, spurring faster TFP growth. 
As noted earlier, the three channels for the peace dividend are linked and complementary.  
Eventually, their overall contribution to Sri Lanka‘s growth prospects will depend on 
improvements in the country‘s growth fundamentals.  Box 1 spells out the ramifications of the 
term ‗growth fundamentals‘ for Sri Lanka.   
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Box 1: Growth Fundamentals in Sri Lanka’s Context 
In Sri Lanka‘s case, a distinction is worth making between factors which will result in a one-time upward 
shift in the level of output and self-sustaining growth as a result of innovation and technological upgrading.  
The post-war bounce from reintegration and the full utilization of excess capacity are examples of one-time 
positive shifts in output.   
To get onto a trajectory of sustained, faster growth, Sri Lanka will need to raise national savings rates and 
create conditions for faster TFP growth: an enduring result in the empirical growth literature is that long-
run per capita growth is driven eventually by TFP growth.  Cross-country experience indicates that a 
sustainable government debt trajectory is a necessary foundation for solid, long-run growth.  At the 
microeconomic level, competition, especially from imports, and hard budget constraints will provide the 
incentive for profit-maximizing firms to adopt new technology, expand their product mix and find new 
markets, all of which will contribute to faster productivity growth.  At a deeper level, meeting these 
requirements calls for good governance and strong fiscal, financial and judicial institutions.  These are 
needed to ensure well-managed public finances on the one hand and the property rights, level playing field 
and predictable environment on the other that will give private firms, domestic and foreign, the confidence 
to make long-run investment commitments.  
Three other Sri Lanka-specific issues are worth emphasizing:  
 The critical importance of good leadership as emphasized in the Commission on Growth and 
Development 2009 report, in particular, the assurance of inclusion combined with a long-term 
development vision 
 Nurturing ethnic peace and social stability 
 Taking advantage of Sri Lanka‘s favorable geography in relation to China and India. 
 
III. MACRO-FISCAL UNDERPINNINGS OF LONG RUN GROWTH 
GoSL has set itself the target of growing at 8 percent or more per year in real terms over 
the medium term in pursuit of doubling per capita income to $4,000 by 2016 starting from $2,000 
in 2009.  How do the two targets, doubling nominal US dollar GDP per capita and achieving real 
GDP growth of 8 percent, mesh with each other?  Box 2 goes through the accounting 
reconciliation.  Its main point is that the doubling of per capita income from $1,000 in 2004 to 
$2,000 in 2009 involved a large real appreciation of the Sri Lankan rupee against the US dollar, 
of 7.5 percent per year; had the real exchange rate been flat, dollar income would have increased 
only by 40 percent and not 100 percent.  Looking ahead, keeping up this pace of real appreciation 
would almost surely create severe competitiveness problems for Sri Lanka (see Rowe, Mishra and 
Rodarte 2011).  Fortunately, repeating the above calculation for the period 2009 to 2016 shows 
that a flat real exchange rate will achieve a doubling of dollar per capita income provided the real 
GDP growth target of 8 percent is achieved.   It almost goes without saying that lasting peace is a 
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pre-requisite for improvements in the country's growth fundamentals to realize better 
development outcomes (Chen, Loayza and Reynal-Querol 2008). In other words, Sri Lanka will 
have to pay close attention to the growth fundamentals outlined in Box 1.  
Box 2: Doubling US dollar per capita GDP between 2009 and 2016 
 
 
Sri Lanka took 13 years to double its nominal dollar per capita GDP from US$ 500 in 1991 to US$ 1,000 in 
2004.  Five years later, in 2009, per capita income had doubled once again to roughly US$ 2,000 as shown 
in the figure. The Mahinda Chinthana‘s vision is to achieve another doubling of dollar per capita income by 
2016. 
To get a better sense of the challenge involved, we use the following identity: 
        
                
       
, 
where G$ is nominal US dollar per capita growth, g is real GDP growth,   is the growth in the bilateral Sri 
Lankan rupee-US dollar real exchange rate (defined such that a positive value is an appreciation),     is 
U.S. inflation and pgr is the population growth (all compound annual average growth rates).  
During the period 2004 – 2009, real GDP growth was 6 percent with the population growth rate at 1 
percent, implying per capita growth of 5 percent per year.  Yet dollar per capita GDP grew at a huge 15 
percent per year.  Assuming 2 percent US inflation, the above identity tells us that the big driver of G$ was 
a rapidly appreciating bilateral real exchange rate, recording an annual average appreciation of 7.5 percent.  
 
Experience from emerging markets the world over demonstrates that sustainable public 
finances are an essential underpinning for fast growth.  Achieving low inflation rates is not 
enough.  Public debt has to be on a trajectory deemed sustainable by the markets.  Otherwise, 
there may be concerns about monetization of the debt and a rise in inflation, which could keep 
nominal and real interest rates high.  This section starts by discussing broad fiscal outcomes of 
the past with a view to better understanding what future fiscal outcomes might look like. Next it 
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looks at the management of the public finances from the prism of debt sustainability and shows 
how the underlying determinants of the path of the debt-to-GDP ratio (―debt dynamics‖) are 
likely to change quite drastically going forward.  In particular, reducing indebtedness further will 
have to rely more on faster growth and higher primary fiscal surpluses than on inflation, which 
was a prime factor (along with moderate growth) in eroding the government debt-to-GDP ratio 
over 2005-08.  Lastly, the implications of GoSL‘s medium run fiscal targets for government 
saving are discussed. 
a. A Brief History of Fiscal Policy in Sri Lanka 
Before 1977, Sri Lanka‘s development strategy was based on import substitution with the 
government aiming to create a comprehensive welfare state.  Its enviable social development 
indicators for its stage of development testify to the importance placed on social expenditures in 
the budget. An extensive network of welfare expenditures and consumer subsidies was paid for 
with trade tax revenues. In 1985, export taxes and import tariffs made up 30 percent of revenues. 
Fiscal outcomes in Sri Lanka over the past three decades display three main features.  
First, revenue from trade taxes has been in secular decline since 1985, reaching 18 percent of 
revenues in 2010 as a result of the post 1977 reforms, which liberalized external trade.  Falling 
trade taxes led to falling fiscal revenues: government revenues as a share of GDP declined from 
23 percent in 1980 to just 14 percent in 2010.  The good news is that the 2011 Budget has 
initiated a systematic effort to increase revenue mobilization through new tax instruments and 
improved tax policy, including by revisiting the tax breaks provided by the Board of Investment 
(BOI).   
Second, government subsidies to both consumers and state owned enterprises have been 
consistently significant in expenditures, ranging from 4 to 7 percent of GDP over the years.  
 Third, since the outbreak of the conflict in 1983 defense expenditures have consumed an 
ever-growing share of total expenditure. With social expenditure and subsides being protected, 
capital spending has borne the brunt of cuts after 1980 to keep fiscal deficits under control 
11 
 
(Figure 3). However, these cuts were not enough to offset the decline in revenues, resulting in a 
fiscal deficit that has averaged 10 percent over the last thirty years.   
Figure 3. Sri Lanka: Drivers of Fiscal Outcomes 
  
A direct consequence is that interest costs have grown from 4.6 percent of GDP in 1985 
to an average 6 percent of GDP for much of the recent decade. Rising interest costs started to kick 
in during the 1990s when there was a dramatic fall in concessional sources of financing as the 
conflict intensified. Overseas development assistance fell from on average 8.5 percent of GDP in 
the 1980s to just 2 percent of GDP by 2000, as shown in Figure 3 (b).  Non-concessional external 
debt and much more expensive domestic debt became the main sources of financing in these 
years, helping to drive up both the stock of debt and interest costs. 
b. Debt Dynamics  
We focus on government debt dynamics since the late 1990s, which have been driven by 
the interaction among aid inflows, the conflict, inflation and economic growth outcomes.  Going 
forward, debt dynamics are likely to be quite different from the historical evolution described 
here.  In particular, faster growth and raising primary fiscal surpluses will need to be the focal 
points if Sri Lanka is to attain its goal of reducing government indebtedness to 60 percent by 
2016.   
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Figure 4 plots the ratio of government debt to GDP (―debt ratio‖) from 1997 to 2010.  It 
peaked at 106 percent in 2002 after rising by some 23 percentage points of GDP starting in 1997.  
It then fell by some 20 percentage points between 2002 and 2009.  
 
To get a better sense of the underlying factors driving this debt trajectory, we carried out 
a decomposition exercise aimed at apportioning changes in the debt ratio over the period 1998-
2010 to the primary fiscal deficit, real GDP growth, the real interest rate and the real exchange 
rate.
6
  In addition to these main drivers of debt dynamics, the effect of revenues from 
privatization (‗divestment‘) and other, unidentified factors are shown in the last two rows of 
Table 1.  The way to interpret the numbers in the table is as follows: the first row gives the actual 
change in the debt ratio for each sub-period in percentage points of GDP per year (the reason for 
such ―annualization‖ is that the sub-periods are not equal in length).  For example, over 1998-
2004, debt increased by an average rate of 2.8 percentage points of GDP per year, while it fell by 
some 3 percentage points per year over 2006-08.  The numbers in the other rows give the average 
annual impact of each underlying factor for each sub-period in percentage points of GDP: a 
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 The technical details and derivations can be found in the appendix to Aizenman and Pinto (2005). 
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positive (negative) number means that the factor concerned raised (lowered) the debt ratio during 
that sub-period. 
 
If we compare the debt build-up phase, 1998-2004 (when debt rose sharply and stayed 
above 100 percent of GDP until 2004) with the subsequent rapid decline over 2005-2010:
7
  
 The primary fiscal deficit hovered around 2 percent of GDP—there was not significant 
change here 
 Faster growth over 2005-2010 resulted in an additional erosion in the debt ratio equal to 1.5 
percentage points of GDP per year (-3.8 over 1998-2004 compared to -5.3 over 2005-2010) 
 Combined real interest rate and real exchange rate impact went from +2.5 percentage points 
of GDP over 1998-2004 to -2.4 percentage points over 2005-2010, a swing of close to 5 
percentage points per year.  This was the biggest factor by far and explicable largely by a 
pick-up in inflation, as we shall see below.   
Almost half of the 24 percentage point reduction in the debt ratio between 2002 and 2010 
occurred that year, which followed the devastating tsunami of December 2004. Nominal interest 
rates dropped significantly and the currency appreciated in nominal and real terms as aid inflows 
                                                     
7
 These observations are based on comparing the numbers for 1998-2004 with those for 2005-2010.  The 
reason for splitting up the latter period in Table 1 will become apparent below.  
1998-2004 2005 2006-08 2009-2010
Change in Government Debt / GDP 2.76 -11.72 -3.08 0.28
Underlying factors:
      Primary balance 2.17 2.13 1.95 2.55
      Real GPD growth -3.79 -6.01 -5.62 -4.57
      Real Interest Rate 1.68 -1.36 -1.11 2.49
      Real Exchange Rate 0.81 -3.92 -1.98 -2.48
      Privatization -0.3 -0.04 0 0
 Other factors 2.19 -2.84 3.58 2.30
Source: CBSL Annual Reports, Bank staff calculations.
Table 1 : Factors Explaining Government Debt to GDP Path
a/
a/ 
The numbers in the table are the average annual  impact of each factor for each sub-period of time in percentage 
points of GDP. 
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surged by 2 percentage points of GDP.  Inflation rose to double-digit levels.  The drop in real 
interest rates to negative levels and the appreciation of the real exchange rate explain almost half 
the fall in the debt ratio that year; while a pick-up in growth as tsunami-related reconstruction 
began explains the rest of the decline. 
After 2005, ODA flows declined, the conflict intensified and domestic inflation started to 
accelerate in part due to the international food and fuel prices crisis of 2007-08.  Real exchange 
rate appreciation and a decline in real interest rates continued to play an important role in 
reducing the debt ratio during 2006-08. Again, robust real GDP growth pulled the ratio in the 
same direction, while the primary deficit acted to halt an otherwise bigger decline in the ratio.   
The years 2009-10 are isolated for two reasons. First, these years reflect the impact of the 
global financial crisis on Sri Lanka and the subsequent rebound from it; growth fell to 3.5 percent 
in 2009 and then accelerated to 8 percent part of which may be explicable by the peace dividend. 
Second, these years provide the first hint that the debt dynamics in Sri Lanka are about to change 
in fundamental ways. Overall, the debt ratio remained largely unchanged from its 2008 level of 
81 percent of GDP.  As in the previous two periods, the strong appreciation of the real exchange 
rate reduced the debt burden, but unlike in the past, the real interest rate effect increased it by an 
almost offsetting amount. 
c. Role of Inflation 
This brings us to a critical point: inflation has played a significant role in reducing the 
debt ratio since 2005.  Figure 5(a) depicts the composite real interest rate over the period 1998 to 
2009; the composite real interest rate captures the joint impact of real interest rates and the real 
exchange rate on total indebtedness, foreign currency and rupee.
8
  It was consistently positive 
                                                     
8
 See technical annex for derivation.  The advantage of working with the composite real interest rate is that 
it readily enables a comparison with the real interest rate used for projections of the debt ratio into the 
future—which are often done in a single currency environment (note that Table 1 separates the real interest 
rate and exchange rate effects). 
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until 2005, when it entered strongly negative territory as inflation picked up during the years 
2005-08 and became a major factor in the erosion of the debt ratio.  
Figure 5. Sri Lanka: Inflation and Debt Dynamics 
  
Figure 5 (b) depicts the implicit revenues secured by GoSL from inflation, labeled 
―inflation tax on debt‖, which averaged a huge 9 percentage points of GDP per year over the four 
years 2005-08.  There is no free lunch: if inflation persists, rational investors in government 
securities would soon demand higher nominal interest rates and the rupee would tend to 
depreciate, reducing the effective proceeds from the inflation tax.  For example, the proceeds 
from the inflation tax on debt were close to 12 percent of GDP in 2001 but neutralized by high 
nominal interest rates and a large depreciation of the rupee (leading to a zero composite real 
interest rate as shown in Figure 5(a)).  But this was not the case over 2005-08, leading to large, 
negative composite real interest rates over this period.  Three reasons for the relatively muted 
response of nominal interest rates and the exchange rate might be the large inflow of foreign aid 
after the tsunami; the dominant role of state banks in the domestic government debt market 
combined with the unseemly optics of demanding high nominal rates during a war effort; and the 
relatively closed capital account, limiting the menu of alternative investments. 
Going forward, the situation promises to be dramatically different.  The composite real 
interest rate being assumed by GoSL in its medium-term program is plus 3 percent, indicating 
that it is not banking on negative real interest rates.  This incorporates a major switch in the 
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government‘s debt dynamics.  The Central Bank has also announced a medium-term target of 6 
percent for the GDP deflator.  The implications of this are captured by the dotted line in Figure 5 
(b), which computes the inflation tax at the target rate of 6 percent.  The difference between the 
two graphs is a measure of the ‗excess‘ inflation tax on debt over this historical period, which 
shrank dramatically in 2009 as inflation fell to single-digit levels. With the Central Bank‘s single 
digit inflation target for the medium-term and a more-or-less flat real exchange rate, the 
expectation of positive real interest rate going forward is well founded.  
Additionally, the central bank is engaged in a systematic opening up of the capital 
account ( Box 3).  This too will limit the ability to use the inflation tax as investors will now have 
alternatives, increasing the inflation elasticity of rupee-denominated assets.  Therefore, going 
forward, one should expect a sharply reduced role for inflation in curbing indebtedness.  In other 
words, reducing indebtedness to 60 percent of GDP is going to require faster growth and fiscal 
reform to raise primary fiscal surpluses.   
Box 3: Financial Liberalization – Growth or Vulnerability? 
The goal of the financial system is to help with resource mobilization and allocation as well as risk 
management in pursuit of faster long-run growth.  It can, however, itself become a costly source of 
vulnerability.  In particular, emerging economies pursuing open capital accounts and external financial 
integration have often found that the eventual result was higher macroeconomic vulnerability than faster 
growth.  Vulnerability was more apt to take hold in countries where public finances were weak, exchange 
rates fixed, international liquidity low (low foreign exchange reserves relative to the claims on them) and 
current account deficits large. 
At the same time, emerging market countries like India and China, which are growing rapidly, have moved 
cautiously on external financial integration and relied substantially on national savings in order to finance 
investment and growth.   
Sri Lanka has an excellent credit history: it has never defaulted on its debt even during the long civil war.  
Risk premia have fallen sharply following the end of the war (see Figure 2) and growing confidence in 
economic policy.  GoSL has announced a medium-term plan to lower its fiscal deficit and the government‘s 
debt-to-GDP ratio.   
Armed with these strengths, CBSL has embarked upon an extensive liberalization of the capital account. 
Experience indicates that this program needs to be implemented cautiously.  While there has been a 
substantial build up in foreign exchange reserves under the IMF program, these were less than short-term 
external debt at the end of 2011. And the equivalent of some $2.4 billion in government securities issued in 
the domestic market is held by foreign portfolio investors—although a cap of 12.5 percent has been placed 
on foreign investment in the government debt market.  
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d. Fiscal Targets and Government Saving 
As stipulated in the Fiscal Management (Responsibility) Act No 3 of 2003, GoSL 
announced its medium-term macro fiscal framework in November 2010 covering the period up to 
2013, in which it intends to maintain government capital expenditure at 6.5 percent of GDP while 
lowering the fiscal deficit to 5 percent of GDP by 2013.  These targets imply significant 
challenges for the management of the public finances as can be readily seen from the accounting 
identity in equation (1).  Equation (1) says that the fiscal deficit is simply the difference between 
government investment (annual capital expenditure) and government saving (revenue minus 
current spending): 
(1) 
   
   
 
  
   
 
  
   
 , 
 where the left hand side is the ratio of the fiscal deficit (total expenditure G minus total revenues 
T) to GDP and I
G
 and S
G
 are government capital expenditure and saving respectively.  If the fiscal 
deficit is to be brought down to 5 percent of GDP while capital expenditure is kept at 6.5 percent 
of GDP, it follows from (1) that government savings will have to be raised from the current levels 
averaging minus 2 to 3 percent to plus 1.5 percent, a significant swing of 3.5 to 4.5 percentage 
points of GDP in very short order.   
A similar effort is needed to ensure that government debt falls to 60 percent of GDP by 
2015.  This will require the primary surplus to be raised from minus 2 percent of GDP on average 
over the last decade to zero immediately followed by a gradual increase to a little over 1percent 
of GDP by 2015.
9
  Slower growth or higher real interest rates will require a bigger fiscal effort.  
In the next section, we focus on long-run growth dynamics and the sustainability of the 
post-conflict growth acceleration. 
                                                     
9
 This calculation assumes a linear reduction in the debt ratio from 81 percent in 2010 to 60 percent in 
2015, a real interest rate of 3 percent and real GDP growth of 8 percent per year.  Once the goal of 60 
percent is reached, Sri Lanka will be able to run primary deficits of close to 3 percent of GDP yet maintain 
the 60 percent debt ratio; but this crucially rests on the persistence of a differential of 5 percentage points 
between the real growth rate and real interest rate and the desirability of keeping the debt ratio at 60 
percent. 
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IV. SUSTAINABILITY OF HIGH GROWTH 
 This section sets out the challenge of sustaining the high growth rates.  As a starting 
point, Box 4 lays out the ―growth arithmetic‖ commonly used to ascertain the savings rates Sri 
Lanka would need to fulfill its growth aspirations.  While this framework is helpful in assessing 
the savings effort needed from the public and private sectors to achieve economic growth targets, 
the arithmetic runs into trouble because it assumes a constant incremental capital-output ratio 
(ICOR), which is equivalent to assuming constant marginal returns to capital. In practice, with 
capital subject to diminishing marginal returns, the savings rate needed to support a target growth 
rate will rise over time for given total factor productivity, labor force and human capital growth 
rates.  For the same reason, we would expect to see an increase in the ratio of capital to output 
over time.  Therefore, a dynamic framework allowing for diminishing marginal returns to capital 
is needed to get a better sense of the medium-to-long term links between savings and growth.  
Box 4: Harrod-Domar Growth Arithmetic: Simple, but Incomplete 
Numerical calculations of the savings rate needed to support a target growth rate are commonly carried out 
using the Harrod-Domar equation.  This equation can be obtained as follows:  
    
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 , 
where g is the growth rate of real GDP, Y, and K is the physical capital stock.  The first term in brackets on 
the right-hand side is the inverse of the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) while the second is the 
investment rate.  The simplest version of the framework assumes a closed economy so that the investment 
rate equals the savings rate, s. Therefore, given a target growth rate g*, the required savings rate s* based 
on the equation is the ICOR multiplied by g*. 
Given the Sri Lankan real GDP growth target of 8 percent and an ICOR of 4.5, the required investment rate 
would be 36 percent of GDP.  If one assumes a sustainable current account deficit of 4 percent of GDP, 
then the required national savings rate s* would be 32 percent.  Suppose the ICOR goes down to 4 as a 
result of growing productivity and efficiency as part of the peace dividend.  Then s* would fall to 28 
percent. 
With national savings averaging 22 percent of GDP over the last decade, the increase in the savings rate 
would need to be 6 percent of GDP.  Achieving the fiscal target of raising government savings from -2 
percent to +1.5 percent of GDP would require an increase in the private savings rate of an additional 2.5 
percent of GDP, which is eminently feasible. 
While this appealing framework indicates that a target growth rate of 8 percent is readily within grasp, it is 
subject to pitfalls beyond the very short run.  These are discussed in the text.    
 With this in mind, we present results below drawn from a dynamic simulation framework 
calibrated with parameters and data drawn from Sri Lanka‘s own past experience as well as that 
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of other developing countries using a modified Solow growth model.
10
  In this model, growth is 
driven by the following main variables: 
 Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth:  The growth rate of TFP is exogenous in the 
simulation framework.  Historically, it has averaged around 1 percent per year in Sri Lanka.  
In Scenario 1, it is assumed to accelerate to 1.75 percent, which represents a substantial 
increase.  A further acceleration to 2.5 percent is assumed under Scenario 2, a TFP growth 
rate few countries exhibit over long periods.
11
 
 Capital accumulation:  The capital-to-output ratio for 2010 is determined by the perpetual 
inventory method with an assumed 8 percent depreciation rate (details may be found in Hevia 
and Loayza 2011, henceforth, H-L).  The subsequent dynamics of the capital stock are 
determined by the path of national savings and the current account deficit with suitable 
adjustments for depreciation. 
 Savings:  National savings is the sum of private savings and government (public) savings.  
Private savings is treated as endogenous and depends upon income and demographic 
variables (such as the ratio of old-age or young-age population to working age population) as 
well as public saving (through so-called Ricardian effects). Public savings could either be 
given as a policy variable (as determined by the announced fiscal targets, for example) or as a 
balancing figure needed to attain a required national savings rate. 
 Labor force and Human Capital growth: The ratio of working age population to total 
population (―labor force‖) is based on demographic projections while the quality of the work 
force (―human capital‖) is determined in accordance with the number of years of schooling 
and the returns to education.  Both variables are exogenous.  
 External sustainability:  The simulation framework assumes that Sri Lanka will be able to 
increase net external indebtedness along a path which yields a sustainable current account 
deficit in the 4 percent of GDP range. 
The simulation framework (Annex 2 presents the underlying equation) is used to answer 
two types of questions: what is the national savings rate needed to support a given growth target?  
And for a given target for public savings, what growth path will emerge?  Figure 6 summarizes 
the results from Scenario 1 with 1.75 percent TFP growth.  Panel (a) shows the national savings 
                                                     
10
 The framework and detailed results are contained in Hevia and Loayza (2011). 
11
 As Hevia and Loayza (2011) note, 1.75 percent is the average TFP growth rate in the top 25 percent of 
countries in a worldwide sample; 2.5 percent would constitute a ―miracle‖ scenario.  
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trajectory required for 8 percent real GDP growth (which translates to 7.2 percent per capita 
growth) over 2011-2015. The national savings rate has to increase to 41 percent by 2015 in order 
to deliver this growth rate.  
Figure 6. Growth  Scenario 1 
TFP Growth 1.75 percent 
GDP Growth per Capita Target = 7.2% over 2011-2015  
          (a).                                                                                                                     (b).  
  
 Source: Hevia and Loayza (2011) 
How will the required savings rate of 41 percent for Sri Lanka be split between private 
and public savings?  With private savings determined endogenously, most of the action will need 
to come from raising public savings, as shown in the figure.  Public savings will need to increase 
from negative levels in 2010 to close to 20 percent of GDP in 2015 and eventually plateau around 
23 percent of GDP.  Going beyond 2015, the simulation assumes that the 41 percent national 
savings rate will be maintained into the future.  However, as a consequence of diminishing 
marginal returns to capital, the growth rate of GDP declines to 4 percent by 2030 even if the 
savings rate of 41 percent is maintained.  Indeed, to keep real GDP growth at 8 percent over the 
long run, the national savings would have to continuously rise above 41 percent.  Box 5 provides 
an explanation for why the savings rate must keep rising to achieve a given growth target. 
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Box 5: Why the Savings Rate Must Keep Rising with a Given Growth Target 
Why must the savings rate rise continuously in the neoclassical framework underpinning the Hevia-Loayza 
simulation model to maintain a target growth rate? With the growth rates of TFP, human capital, the labor 
force, and population given exogenously, (let‘s refer to their sum as z), the only way for the growth rate of 
GDP to stay constant at some target level   is for the capital stock to grow at a constant rate.  For this to 
happen in the presence of diminishing marginal returns to capital, a fundamental assumption in the 
neoclassical framework, the savings rate must continuously increase.   
Let output, Y, be given by:               where A is TFP, K is the stock of physical capital, E is the 
working age population (―number of workers‖) augmented by the human capital variable,  , to obtain 
effective labor input, and       is the elasticity of output with respect to capital (  being less than 1 
implies diminishing marginal returns to capital).  Then we can write the growth equation: 
(i)                            ,  
where a ―^‖ refers to the growth rate of a variable:         is the growth rate of output,   is the growth 
rate of the capital stock,    is TFP growth, and    is the growth rate of human capital.  We can write 
           where   is the ratio of working age population, E, to total population, N, which then gives 
      , where   is the population growth rate, completing the expression on the right-hand-side of 
equation (i).  The expression in square brackets is the z referred to in the first paragraph of this box.    
It follows from (i), for a given z and target growth rate   , that   must satisfy:  
(ii)   
    
 
.   
In other words, the capital stock must grow at the constant rate given by this equation.  Now   
               where s is the national savings rate, c (assumed constant) is the ratio of the current 
account deficit to output, and   is the rate of depreciation of capital.  This can be rewritten: 
(iii)         
 
 
     
Combining (ii) and (iii) gives us an expression for the required savings rate, s*, to meet a given growth 
target, g*: 
(iv)     
    
 
    
 
 
     
In equation (iv), K/Y is the reciprocal of the average product of capital, APK.  Since APK goes down with 
K because of diminishing marginal returns (recall that APK is proportional to the marginal product of 
capital with the Cobb-Douglas production function assumed for Y)  it follows from (iv) that s must rise over 
time to maintain growth at its target level of g*.   
Two corollaries emerge from the above: 
 Suppose the savings rate is raised to meet a given growth target in line with (iv) and then held constant.  
In this case, growth will slow until it reaches its steady-state value given by 
  
   
      along a 
balanced growth path (meaning that the capital stock grows at the same rate), that is, the asymptotic 
growth rate of GDP is determined by TFP growth, human capital and population growth (the 
assumption is that the ratio of working age population to total population eventually stabilizes). Using 
(i), it follows that in steady state,        
 
   
                       , which is simply a 
way of decomposing the expression for steady-state growth earlier in this bullet into components 
attributable to TFP, capital accumulation, human capital and population growth (as in Table 2 below).   
 Any forces which lead to non-diminishing marginal returns to capital (―endogenous growth‖) will 
obviously be beneficial and require a lower savings rate for a given growth target.  (Some of this is 
discussed in section V on the microfoundations of growth.) 
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Notice from Figures 7(a) and (b), which show savings and growth rates for China and 
India, that the need for high savings rates for sustained fast growth is hardly extravagant. 
Figure 7. National Savings and Growth: China and India 
  
This exercise brings out two points: first, achieving 8 percent growth over the medium 
term in Sri Lanka will call for a huge fiscal effort to increase public savings substantially.  
Second, even assuming the required level of savings is achieved, it will not suffice to maintain an 
8 percent growth rate over the long run.  Since achieving the desired level of public savings may 
not be feasible, Figures 8 (a) and (b) shows the growth dynamics consistent with the targeted 
level of public savings of 1.5 percent of GDP to be attained by 2012.  This will constrain the 
overall level of national savings to a little over 25 percent of GDP in the medium run, leveling off 
at just below 25 percent over the long run.  Sri Lanka does not reach the 8 percent growth target 
even over the medium run and the growth rate drops to less than 4 percent over the longer run.  
Figures 9 (a) and (b) depict Scenario 2 reconciling the government‘s growth targets with 
its savings target of 1.5 percent of GDP.  The key difference from the previous simulation is the 
assumption that TFP will grow at 2.5 percent per year over the long term.  Based on cross-
country experience, this is not impossible but is hard to achieve: this is a highly optimistic 
scenario.  National savings need to rise to approximately 27 percent over the long-term; recall 
from Figure 7 that this is substantially less than the savings rates achieved by China and India.  
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Real GDP growth is maintained at the 8 percent target until 2014 and then declines although it 
stays above 6 percent until the end of the decade.  Eventually, it settles at a rate which is similar 
to Sri Lanka‘s historical average growth rate of 5 percent. 
 Figure 8. Growth Scenario 1 With Government Savings of 1.5% of GDP 
TFP Growth 1.75 percent 
         (a).                                                                                                                    (b). 
  
Figure 9. Growth Scenario 2 
TFP Growth 2.5 percent 
Public Saving / GDP = 1.5% by 2013 
            (a).                                                                                                               (b). 
  
Source: Hevia and Loayza (2011)  
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Table 2 illustrates the challenges inherent in the long run growth dynamics when the 
public (government) savings rate is constrained.  It presents a decomposition of the various 
factors contributing to growth in the Optimistic Scenario with government savings rising to its 
target of 1.5 percent of GDP. One of the striking features is the negative contribution to growth 
from the labor force for most of the simulation period because the working age population is 
expected to experience a decline until at least 2020.  
 
In sum, the realization of an 8 percent growth rate sustained over the long term will 
require significant increases in the national savings rate.  Achieving high rates of TFP growth and 
increasing government savings beyond levels currently contemplated will make it easier to 
achieve the required savings rates—the first by lowering the need for capital accumulation and 
hence the savings rate itself; and the second by putting less pressure on private savings rates.  
Such effort will help offset the diminishing returns to capital and adverse effects of Sri Lanka‘s 
demographics.  The challenge then is to create conditions conducive to large and sustained 
productivity improvements in the context of lower public indebtedness and an attractive 
investment climate.  The next section discusses the micro foundations of growth.   
 
2012 2015 2020 2030 
Real GDP growth 8.1 7.1 5.7 4.7 
GDP per capita growth 7.3 6.4 5.3 4.5 
Contribution to per capita GDP growth 
a 
TFP 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Physical Capital 4.6 3.8 2.7 1.8 
Human Capital 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Labor Force -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Hevia and Loayza 2011. 
a
 Percentage points 
Table 2. Sri Lanka: Growth Simulation results with TFP g=2.5%/year and   
Government Savings reaching 1.5% of GDP by 2012 
Year 
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V. MICRO-FOUNDATIONS FOR SUSTAINED GROWTH 
The private sector investment response in the post-conflict era is hugely important for a 
simple reason: the government‘s role in additional investment is constrained by its balance sheet 
and the medium-run fiscal and debt targets it has announced. As noted in the introduction, the 
peace dividend is likely to have some of its strongest echoes in improved growth fundamentals 
reflected eventually in the emergence of internationally competitive firms and banks.  We briefly 
touch upon four areas that are vitally important for this link to be firmly established and thereby 
generate a sustained growth acceleration. 
a. Credibility and Signaling 
In any situation involving a big change, the private sector, foreign and domestic, is going 
to ‗wait and see‘. Three main reasons seem to explain the ‗wait and see‘ observed post-conflict in 
Sri Lanka.  First, based on informal interviews conducted for this study, few expected the war to 
end so quickly.  Second, investors want positive signals from the government: key signals are 
discussed below.   Third, the external environment is uncertain.  Global growth is expected to 
slow in 2011 and Sri Lankan exports are heavily dependent upon the USA and EU.  Besides, the 
Euro periphery is mired in a debt crisis.   
A huge advantage GoSL has in creating an enabling environment for sustained rapid 
growth is its big political majority.  This enables the government to be decisive in creating an 
attractive environment for private business and going for some quick wins to signal its intentions.  
Indeed, positive signals have already been transmitted via the 2011 Budget with its list of tax 
reforms and plans to clarify the role of the Board of Investment and the release of the Central 
Bank‘s Roadmap.  The 2011 Budget has been extolled both for its content and maintaining 
continuity with the 2010 Budget and the medium-term fiscal and debt targets.  The challenge is to 
establish the credibility of the signals through decisive implementation of the adopted macro-
fiscal framework.   
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A critical positive step is the reduction in marginal tax rates from 35 to 28 percent for 
corporate income, the reduction of personal income taxes and the extension of income tax to 
public servants.  The VAT has been reduced from 22 to 12 percent and from 20 to 12 percent for 
the financial sector.  The decision to bring public sector employees into the tax net was widely 
praised as promoting a ―tax culture‖. 
Areas where the private sector is seeking clarity include: 
 Relative roles of the public and private sector:  A clear policy statement and consistent 
adherence to it regarding the role of the state in economic activity will be needed to provide 
an unambiguous signal to domestic and foreign investors that the private sector will be the 
future engine of economic growth in Sri Lanka.  
 Role of the Board of Investment:  Many remarked that with the end of conflict, the Board of 
Investment will need to reinvent itself.  In particular, the need for ad hoc tax breaks will 
diminish.  However, the precise role to be played by the BoI needs to be defined. 
The big majority of the government also enables it to take decisive steps in promoting 
ethnic peace and healing.  The criticality of social and ethnic peace in promoting long-run growth 
is demonstrated in several empirical studies, e.g. Rodrik (1999).  Reconstruction, ethnic healing 
and the restoration of trust are likely to take several years, calling for a sustained effort.   
b. Private Investment Incentives 
The general decline in country risk in the immediate post-conflict environment should 
lower the cost of capital for domestic firms, while the adoption of sound policies should lengthen 
investment horizons for both domestic and foreign investors.  The positive impact can be shown 
by the equation:  
(2)          
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which captures the standard condition that profit maximizing private investors will invest until 
the marginal product of capital MPK equals the real interest rate, r, plus depreciation,  .  In a 
conflict environment, the right-hand-side would also include a premium to compensate for the 
associated risk.  On the assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital, this would lower 
the optimal capital stock and therefore investment.  Reducing or eliminating this risk premium 
would have the opposite effect and increase investment.  Similarly, the lengthening of horizons 
would enlarge the set of potential investments firms would consider, some of which may take 
several years to reach break-even volumes or involve set-up costs in introducing and marketing 
new products—considerations that would not be appealing in a conflict situation.  Companies are 
likely to be induced to implement projects put on hold during the conflict while foreign investors 
could be expected to pay more attention to the country.   
However, the above will only lead to a one-time positive effect on output.  The real gains 
to Sri Lanka will come from a sustained increase in productivity as a result of technological 
upgrading catalyzed by the falling cost of capital and rising returns to private capital at least for a 
period.  This can be shown by the formalism: 
(3)                     
where the right-hand-side lists the variables that the MPK depends upon: total factor productivity 
or technology, TFP; human capital, HK; public investments, including those in infrastructure, I
G
; 
and an index of externalities,    which could include positive spillovers and agglomeration effects 
and promote endogenous growth.
12
  By raising the marginal returns to capital, these factors can 
play a major role in stimulating investment.  Some of these factors have a public good 
characteristic, importantly, investments in infrastructure and human capital, which could be 
facilitated by reduced public spending on security as part of the peace dividend.  But there is also 
a private aspect: firms could upgrade their technology confident that their property rights will be 
                                                     
12
 This formalism is similar to equation (4), page 8, in Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2005). 
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protected and that a lasting peace will prevent any disruption of operations or damage to fixed 
assets.  However, they will need incentives to do so, and experience shows that firms are more 
likely to invest when in better technology and raise productivity when there is pressure on their 
profit margins and they realize that (apart from the promise of strong institutions, the protection 
of property rights and reliable infrastructure) there will be no special help forthcoming from the 
government.  In other words, when hard budget constraints and competition, both from domestic 
and foreign sources, are present.
13
 Box 6 discusses competitiveness in Sri Lanka (with more 
details in Annex 3), while the next section focuses on hard budget constraints for state-owned 
enterprises.  
Box 6. Sri Lanka: A Survey of Constraints to Doing Business 
A scan of the recent survey-based indicators of the business climate and overall competitiveness in Sri 
Lanka reveals a promising outlook for the business environment provided the commitment to implement 
stated government policy remains strong. The main take away from the survey-based evidence is that 
macroeconomic policy constraints have been consistently at or near the top of the main constraints to doing 
business in Sri Lanka.  
Sri Lanka ranks 89 out of 183 countries in the World Bank Group‘s overall ―Doing Business‖ rankings in 
2012, with tax policy being long considered a major drag on private sector investment. The same result 
comes out when looking at recent Global Competitiveness reports. Sri Lanka ranks 62 out of 139 countries 
in the overall Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) 2010-11. Sri Lanka seems to be lagging in terms of 
Macroeconomic environment, especially when it comes to Government budget balance, Government debt, 
and Country credit rating. Labor market efficiency and Technological readiness come out quite low (Sri 
Lanka ranks 128, 111 and 85 out of 139 countries respectively). 
The emergence of internationally competitive firms in Sri Lanka will also depend importantly on the trade 
regime. Here too the conclusion is that it is squarely in the hands of the government to improve the trade 
regime. Although Sri Lanka is not an outlier, the transactions costs of trading across borders are 
significantly higher than in comparator countries. Bureaucratic procedures rather than infrastructure-
imposed or technical constraints are the major source of high transactions costs incurred by exporters and 
importers alike. Redundant regulations and red tape as well as outdated customs procedures that are not 
compatible with requirements of modern trading are impeding the participation of Sri Lankan firms in more 
sophisticated forms of division of labor based on production fragmentation or global value chains.  
c. Hardening Budget Constraints for State-owned Enterprises 
 Hardening budget constraints for state-owned or public enterprises (PEs) is important for 
two reasons: the first is that they can help contain the fiscal burden.  Transfers from the budget 
                                                     
13
 Some of the clearest evidence on the efficacy of hard budgets and competition comes from the transition 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe.  See Pinto, Belka and Krajewski (1993), Carlin, Fries, Schaffer 
and Seabright (1999) and chapter 7 of European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1999). 
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(capital and recurrent) to public enterprises have averaged 1.5 percent of GDP or 6 percent of 
total expenditures in recent years. The stock of debt held by PEs adds to the fiscal burden, as does 
the issuance of government guarantees to support PEs. The Ceylon Electricity Board‘s (CEB) 
electricity tariffs have always been below the cost of production, forcing it to finance most of its 
operations with debt. The Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC) is the largest importer of oil in 
the country, accounting for about 20 percent of total imports and 5 percent of GDP. The CPC 
subsidizes the CEB, transport utilities and other government departments implying that the CPC 
is also forced to borrow for its operations. These circular debts and government guarantees 
amounted to 3.25 percent of GDP in 2010. 
 The second reason is related to the first: to ensure that PEs involved in infrastructure 
provision or carrying out public investments do so efficiently, as this would enhance the 
profitability and attractiveness of private investment.  The Government has recently taken 
measures to raise efficiency in CEB and CPC.  CPC is expected to run a small surplus this year 
resulting from price increases and measures to improve operational efficiency. The outlook for 
medium-term term losses at the CEB appear contained if the cheap, coal-fired and hydropower 
capacity comes on stream as expected. Going forward, restoring profitability and efficiency to 
such companies as CEB constitutes a crucial step in hardening budget constraints.  This in turn 
will have significant implications for general competitiveness via the pricing of critical inputs like 
electricity while creating pressures for innovation and efficiency.   
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Box 7: Snapshot of Public Enterprise sector in Sri Lanka 
The state-owned or public enterprise sector in Sri Lanka has been an important part of the economic policy 
debate in the country for the last thirty years.  Before the first wave of economic liberalization reforms in 
1977, over 60 percent of manufacturing was in the public sector and accounted for half of all 
manufacturing employment, while public entities accounted for nearly 90 percent of all imports and 30 
percent of exports.
14
  Post-1977 reforms greatly reduced these numbers, but public enterprises (PEs) are 
still an important part of the economic landscape.  
The government had a controlling interest in 107 public enterprises in 2009. These PEs are involved in 
many commercial activities, including finance (26), infrastructure (11), agriculture (9), plantations (11), 
construction and manufacturing (16) services (16) and healthcare (6). Taken together, the turnover in PEs 
amounted to almost 17 percent of GDP in 2009. However, this may underestimate the true extent of the 
influence on economic activity as, for example, the two state-owned banks account for over 50 percent of 
the assets of the banking system. Moreover, government has invested directly or indirectly in 52 PE 
subsidiary companies and has golden share holding rights in 23 regional plantation companies. The largest 
SOEs are the CEB and CPC. 
In addition to hardening budgets, an important item on the PE agenda (Box 7 provides a 
snapshot of the public enterprise sector) is to develop a strategic vision regarding their role vis-à-
vis the private sector, which as noted above, is something private investors are seeking.  The 
Government has recently taken over management of Sri Lankan Airlines and Sri Lanka telecom, 
taken ownership of Sri Lanka Insurance Corporation and Shell Gas, and land ownership of Lanka 
Marines Services and Waters Edge Ltd.  It is important clarify the state of play regarding these 
specific companies and related future plans. 
d. Infrastructure and Human Capital 
Public investments in infrastructure and human capital need to be linked to Sri Lanka‘s 
anticipated future sources of growth.  At the macroeconomic level (and as captured in the results 
of the simulation exercise), long run per capita growth is driven by TFP growth, growth in the 
labor force and human capital and capital accumulation as influenced by savings, domestic and 
foreign.  At a more micro level, growth will be driven by the investment decisions of private 
actors in agriculture, manufacturing and services.  One view expressed during interviews is that 
Sri Lanka is too small to permit manufacturing to become a significant driver of long-run growth.  
Another view commonly expressed was that there is a shortage of low-skilled workers; on the 
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 World Bank (2004). 
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other hand, it would be relatively easy to attract high-skill workers back to the country from the 
diaspora.  Further, raising funds even in large volumes was not seen as a serious problem. 
The government itself is positioning services as the future engine of growth.  Its 
development policy framework highlights the importance of bolstering infrastructure for 
achieving its economic growth targets via the five hubs concept—a naval hub, an aviation hub, a 
commercial hub, an energy hub and a knowledge hub in South Asia.  In this connection, IMF 
Staff note in the 2010 Article IV Consultation that Sri Lanka‘s strategic geographical location and 
comparative advantage in services could be the engine of growth in the medium-to-long term.  
The 2011 budget sets public investment at 6.5 percent of GDP in the medium-term 
expenditure framework.  While fiscal consolidation efforts will continue, the government has 
made it clear that public investment spending will remain at this level.  In fact, public 
infrastructure spending has been significant in recent years. Donor commitments since 2005 have 
totaled 20 percent of 2010 GDP, although actual disbursements have been half of that amount 
(see Table 3).  The five main areas of commitments are: roads, power and energy, water supply 
and sanitation, railways, and ports and aviation. The main donor in each area is: Japan in roads, 
China in power and energy, Japan and the ADB in water supply, India in railways, and China and 
the ADB in ports. Overall, China and Japan are the two largest financiers of infrastructure in the 
country. Some of the signature projects are the Hambantota Port (China), the Southern 
Expressway (Japan/ADB) and the Puttalam Coal Power Project (China).  
 
Category Commitment Disbursement Key Donor 
Road Sector 2,553                    1,293                         Japan 
Power & Energy Sector 1,886                    1,311                         China 
Water supply and sanitation 1,168                    657                            Japan/ADB 
Transport Sector - Railways 1,165                    n.a. India 
Ports and Aviation Sector 1,136                    564                            China 
Total 7,907                    3,825                         
Source: Ministry of Finance 
Table 3. Sri Lanka: Infrastructure Financing, 2005 -2010 (US$, millions) 
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 However, positioning services as an engine of growth would require significant 
investments in human capital as well as the ability to attract talent from the diaspora.  In this 
connection, it is worth noting that even traditional services such as tourism can be upgraded, for 
example by adopting more sophisticated forms like medical tourism.  
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY PRIORITIES 
This paper has drawn upon cross-country experience and economic theory to draw out 
the policy implications of GoSL‘s macro-fiscal vision announced after the cessation of hostilities.  
The vision, set out in the introduction, includes the following goals: doubling nominal US dollar 
per capita income; cutting fiscal deficits and government indebtedness substantially; lowering 
inflation; and growing at 8 percent per year over the medium term.  Policies formulated to 
achieve these multiple goals must ensure consistency.  For example, allowing the rupee/dollar 
rate to appreciate in real terms as it has in the recent past will help to double per capita nominal 
dollar income and speedily reduce government indebtedness (since close to 45 percent of 
government debt is denominated in foreign currency).  But this approach will lower 
competitiveness and jeopardize the 8 percent growth target, in turn impeding continued poverty 
alleviation.  An effective way of ensuring consistency would be to establish a hierarchy among 
the various goals with the 8 percent growth given top billing.  This would be in keeping with 
GoSL‘s emphasis on enhancing welfare and inclusion.  It would also automatically help attain the 
dollar per capita income target.  Similarly, the fiscal and debt targets should be viewed not as 
ends in themselves but as facilitating faster growth.  Given this hierarchy, three sets of policy 
priorities emerge. 
The first policy priority is to increase the national savings rate.  The simulation results 
demonstrate that converting the peace dividend into sustained 8 percent real GDP growth will 
require a national savings rate of above 40 percent of GDP even if TFP grows at 1.75 percent per 
year compared to the historical average of 1 percent.  This represents a substantial increase from 
current savings rates of around 25 percent.  Adhering to or even exceeding the government‘s 
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target of raising its savings rate to 1.5 percent of GDP will obviously help in this quest.  At the 
same time, attracting FDI and skilled human capital from the Sri Lankan Diaspora will make a 
big difference.  Both will help to take the pressure off national savings rates by essentially 
tapping foreign sources for augmenting physical and human capital.
15
   
The second policy priority is to create conditions for faster growth which will make it 
easier to attain higher savings rates.  This can be achieved in two ways.  The first is to ensure 
that the government raises its primary fiscal surpluses, which must be done in order to meet its 
target of lowering government indebtedness, in a manner that is growth-promoting.  For example, 
cutting security expenditure as part of the peace dividend and reversing the trend decline in fiscal 
revenues by tax base broadening and improving compliance would be far preferable to cutting 
government capital expenditure or raising marginal tax rates in terms of long-run growth. 
The second way of spurring growth is to create conditions for faster TFP growth.  For 
example, if TFP were to grow at 2.5 percent per year compared to the historical record of 1 
percent, the savings rate needed to support 8 percent growth comes down to less than 30 percent.  
This would not be easy to do since there are few countries which ever attain this magnitude of 
TFP growth on a sustained basis.  Nevertheless, considerable opportunity exists for speeding up 
TFP growth through the implementation of hard budget constraints and competition, as discussed 
in section V on the microfoundations for growth.  In particular, a companion study shows that 
there is ample scope for quickly increasing import competition.  Nominal protection rates are 
high in Sri Lanka.
16
  Dispersion is also high, obscuring price signals for resource allocation.  
Export outcomes have been fairly stagnant over the past couple of decades and there has been 
little dynamism apart from garments—but even garments is now an old story.  Fostering outward 
orientation and increasing import competition is probably the most powerful policy instrument 
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 NB: The simulation results already allow for foreign savings to be tapped in the form of a current 
account deficit (CAD) of approximately 4 percent of GDP.  Attracting large amounts of FDI may permit a 
higher, sustainable CAD. 
16
 See Kaminsky and Ng (2012). 
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available to GoSL to set off faster TFP growth.  It is important to harden budgets for the public 
sector as well to ensure its efficient operation and the provision of infrastructure services in 
power, transport, ports and communications at internationally competitive prices.   
The third policy priority is to transmit unequivocally positive signals to the private 
sector about its role as the engine of growth going forward.  Doing so is crucially important for 
two reasons.  The first is a pragmatic one.  Sri Lanka‘s government balance sheet is heavily 
constrained by indebtedness and the desire to lower this significantly over the medium term, 
implying that much of the needed additional investment will have to come from the private 
sector.  The second reason is that experience from countries as varied as India, Kenya and Poland 
show that profit maximizing firms operating in an atmosphere of competition (domestic and 
especially from imports), hard budget constraints and competitive real exchange rates offer the 
best hope for upgrading technology and efficiency in pursuit of faster productivity growth.  
The three policy priorities will feed off each other and therefore need to be 
implemented as a package.  As growth takes off on the back of higher government savings rates 
and faster TFP growth, the savings rate is likely to increase, helping with additional capital 
accumulation.  And both FDI and skilled human capital from the Diaspora are more likely to be 
attracted under assurances of inclusion and the maintenance of ethnic peace; a stable 
macroeconomic environment; and unambiguously positive signals for the private sector.    
To conclude, faster growth needs to be made the centerpiece of GoSL‘s vision.  While 
reducing fiscal deficits and government indebtedness are important, these targets should not be 
seen as ends in themselves, but rather as promoting economic growth.  Ultimately, it is sustained 
fast growth that will enable all the other targets—including the doubling of per capita dollar 
income and reducing government indebtedness—to be achieved in a lasting manner.   
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Annex 1: Composite Real Interest Rate and Inflation Tax on Debt 
Composite real interest rate: 
The composite real interest rate refers to the    in the following difference equation for the ratio 
of government debt to GDP: 
(A1)                    
  
     
     
      , where:
17
 
d is the ratio of end-year government debt to GDP 
 pd is ratio of primary fiscal deficit to GDP 
g is real GDP growth 
 r
c 
is composite real interest rate 
t is subscript for year.  
 
In equation (A1),    is an amalgam of the real interest rate and real exchange rate effects. Assume 
there are only two currencies: local currency (Rs); and dollars ($).  Let: 
 
  
   nominal interest rate on rupee debt t = 
                                        
                               
 
  
   nominal interest rate on $ debt = 
                                               
                                  
 
Note that   
  is the dollar interest rate.  To get the rupee equivalent rate,   
 
, we adjust for exchange 
rate gains/losses.  Let X denote the Rs/$ nominal exchange rate and D
$
 dollar debt expressed in 
dollars.  Then: 
  
 
  =   
  + 
    
           
    
     
   (The numerator of the second term on the right-hand-side of this 
equation is just the exchange rate gain/loss in Rs).  Hence we get: 
   
    
    , where   is the rate of depreciation of the Rs/$ rate (this equation is just standard 
interest parity). 
Now get the composite nominal interest,  , which is just a weighted average of    and   : 
  
     
         
 
, where: 
w is the weight of rupee debt in total debt at the end of the previous year given by w = 
    
 
    
, where 
    
 is rupee debt at the end of the previous year and           
       
       is total debt at 
the end of the previous year in rupees. 
 
Then    =  
     
   
  - 1, where   is the percentage change in the GDP deflator. 
NB: A faster way of calculating i
c
 is to use the formula 
  
                                              
               . 
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 In this simple formulation, we leave out privatization revenues and abstract from factors such as bailout 
costs, which in addition to the fiscal deficit could add to government debt. 
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Inflation tax on Debt (ITD): 
(A2)       
  
            
      in percentage points of GDP. 
To see why the inflation tax applies to total debt, go back to (A1): 
(A1)                 
  
     
    
        
  
   
     
 
     
  - 1, where    is the composite nominal interest rate. 
      = 
     
 
    
 = 
   
         
 
   
    
. 
Numerator of the last expression immediately above can be rewritten: 
w(  
               
          
Hence,   
   
    
                
        
    
. 
The intuition is that higher inflation would be offset by higher nominal interest rates and 
higher expected exchange rate depreciation. So what you gain in inflation, you lose on higher 
nominal interest rates on rupee debt and higher depreciation on $ debt.  Plugging the 
expression for r
c
 into (A1) and separating out the effects of inflation gives (A2). 
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Annex 2. Savings and Growth in Sri Lanka: Simulation Methodology 
To illustrate the linkages between savings and growth in Sri Lanka we follow the methodology 
presented in Hevia and Loayza (2011).  They use a simple setup that consists of a single sector 
open economy model where output is produced by combining capital and effective units of labor 
inputs. Effective labor grows by increases in human capital (years of schooling) and the growth 
rate of the workforce. The following equation, that links growth rate of output per capita to the 
national saving ratio, the growth rate of productivity, the growth rate of the workforce, the 
increase in human capital and the capital-output ratio, is parameterized using Sri Lanka data: 
 
               
                              
    
    
     
                            
    
where    is the growth rate of per capita output,     is the growth rate of productivity,    is the 
growth rate of the population,    is the growth rate of the labor force variable (ratio of working 
age population to total population, which varies through time with changing demographical 
patterns),        , where exp(.) denotes the exponential function, is used to express labor in 
efficiency units per worker with z years of schooling (an index of human capital), y/k is the 
output-to capital ratio, α is the share of capital in total income, δ is the depreciation rate, σ is the 
national savings to output ratio, and β is the ratio of net foreign liabilities to GDP. This equation 
indicates that per capita output growth is positively related to productivity growth, working age 
population growth relative to population growth, human capital growth, and the national saving 
ratio.  
A brief description of the sources and the calculations behind the parameters required to simulate 
the model for Sri Lanka‘s economy follows18: 
 
Capital accumulation and depreciation rate. The current capital-output ratio:      = 1.314.  
This is the ratio estimated for the year 2010, using a perpetual inventory method to accumulate 
investment in order to produce a measure of the capital stock.  Given the war-related destruction 
of factories, transport facilities, buildings, and other forms of capital, a fixed and relatively low 
depreciation rate (0.04 - 0.08, as in most of the literature) is not reasonable.  The depreciation rate 
to varies in the model, and in order to identify it, a constant rate of TFP growth equal to 0.0107 is 
assumed – i.e. the average reported for Sri Lanka in the last decades by Jorgenson and Vu (2005), 
Collins (2007), and Son (2010). The capital share in output:   = 0.35. This is the average across 
countries that Bernanke and Gürkaynak (2002) obtain using adjusted factor payment data from 
national accounts.  There is no comparable Sri Lanka-specific estimate for the capital share.   
Education and human capital. The annual increase in education:           = 0.05104.  
Education is proxied by the average number of schooling years in the adult population.  This 
estimate for the annual increase in schooling is taken from the Barro and Lee (2010) dataset and 
corresponds to the average annual change for the period 1990-2010. The annual rate of return to 
education:   = 0.07.  This rate of return is used in Bernanke and Gürkaynak (2002) and Collins 
(2007) in their growth accounting exercises, which also consider the average number of schooling 
years in the adult population as the proxy for education (and human capital in general). 
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 For details, see Hevia and Loayza (2011). 
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Labor market. The annual growth rate of the labor force is obtained from the future 
demographic projections for Sri Lanka population aged 15-70 years old, presented in United 
Nations (2011), World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. 
Current account sustainability. The ratio of net foreign liabilities to GDP,  , is assumed to rise 
from its current value of 0.45 to 0.60 gradually in 15 years.  This approximately corresponds to 
the government‘s target of a current account deficit of 4-5% of GDP over the next 5 years and 
declining afterwards.  The current ratio of net foreign liabilities to GDP is obtained from updating 
the Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2007) database.  Official ―international investment position‖ for Sri 
Lanka is not available in the IMF‘s Balance of Payments Statistics. 
TFP, Real GDP growth, savings rate and TFP growth. The real GDP growth target is set at 8 
percent.  This target for the medium term has appeared in many Sri Lankan government 
publications (e.g. Mahinda Chinthana) and speeches (e.g. 2011 Budget Speech).  The initial 
national savings rate is 25 percent.  Growth simulation results presented in this paper are based on 
two scenarios: in Scenario 1, TFP growth is assumed at 1.75 percent, the average TFP growth rate 
for the top quarter of countries in a worldwide sample (see Bernanke and Gürkaynak 2002).  This 
is far above the 1 percent TFP growth rate estimated for Sri Lanka (Collins, 2007, Son, 2010).  
For Scenario2, TFP growth is set at an optimistic level of 2.5 percent. 
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Annex 3. Sri Lanka: Business Climate Indicators 
(a) Global Competitiveness Report for Sri Lanka 2007-
2010 
(b) The Global Competitiveness Index 
2010/11 
Note: From a list of 15 factors, respondents were asked to select the five 
most problematic for doing business in their country and to rank them 
between 1 (most problematic) and 5. The bars in the figure show the 
responses weighted according to their rankings.  
Source:http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/Global%20Competitiv
eness%20Report/index.htm 
Note: The Global Competitiveness Report classify 
countries in, or transitioning in between, three stages of 
economic development: (i) factor driven, (ii) efficiency 
driven, and (iii) innovation driven. 
Source: GCI 2010/11, World Economic Forum 
 
(c)  Policy-induced and logistics-related barriers in Sri Lanka and other comparator countries in 2010 (%) 
 
INDIA MALAYSIA MAURITIUS KOREA SRI LANKA THAILAND 
Nature of Export 
Procedures Days US$ Days US$ Days US$ 
Da
ys US$ Days US$ Days US$ 
Policy-induced barriers 59 50 67 33 71 73 38 12 71 62 64 51 
Logistics-related barriers 41 50 33 67 29 27 63 88 29 38 36 49 
Nature of Import 
Procedures Days US$ Days US$  Days US$  
Da
ys US$  Days US$  Days US$ 
Policy-induced barriers 57 53 71 33 79 70 50 12 75 64 77 47 
Logistics-related barriers 43 47 29 67 21 30 50 88 25 36 23 53 
Source: Calculated from data downloaded from http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
 
 
